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In 2007, a surveillance system for influenza-like illness 
(ILI) and virologic data was established in Beijing, China. 
The system tracked ILI and laboratory-confirmed influenza 
in 153 general hospitals from September 1, 2007, through 
April 30, 2008. To analyze the ILI surveillance data (weekly 
ILI rates and counts) and the effectiveness of the system, 
we used the US Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion Early Aberration Reporting System. The data indicated 
that the highest rate of influenza isolation and the highest 
ILI count occurred in the first week of 2008. The system en-
abled us to detect the onset and peak of an epidemic.
S
urveillance systems in Beijing, People’s Republic of 
China, play a pivotal role in the detection of seasonal 
influenza. They enable the onset and the peak of an influen-
za epidemic to be reported in a timely and accurate manner. 
These systems may be critical to monitoring future emerg-
ing aberrant situations, such as an influenza pandemic.
Since 1997, >400 human cases of infection with avian 
influenza virus A (H5N1) have been documented world-
wide, with death rates of ≈60% (1). Of concern is that these 
influenza A viruses might undergo the genetic changes of 
antigenic  drift  into  novel  pathogenic  forms  (2),  trigger-
ing human influenza pandemics (3). Recently, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) raised the influenza pandemic 
alert to level 6 because of the emergence of the influenza A 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus (4). Experts at WHO believe 
that “the world is now closer to another influenza pandemic 
than at any time since 1968” (5).
An influenza surveillance program, consisting of dis-
ease and virologic data collection, aims to assist in the early 
detection of influenza, help define the distribution of in-
fluenza in the community, and provide timely information 
about circulating strains. These data, in turn, can be used 
to analyze geographic, temporal, and biologic differences 
in circulating influenza strains and assist in monitoring for 
emerging unusual or critical situations, such as a pandemic 
(6–8). This information can guide the crucial process of 
strain selection for vaccine development and other preven-
tion and control strategies (7), as well as aid influenza diag-
nosis and enhance patient care (9–12).
To  use  data  from  a  surveillance  system  efficiently, 
however, public health professionals need suitable and ro-
bust aberration detection methods. The Early Aberration 
Reporting System (EARS) pioneered by the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC; Atlanta, GA, USA) 
was initially a method for monitoring bioterrorism events, 
but it has evolved into a tool that also can be used to moni-
tor  naturally  occurring  outbreaks  and  seasonal  diseases. 
Nonhistorical methods based on a positive 1-sided cumula-
tive sum (CUSUM) calculation in EARS can analyze the 
data without long-term background data (13,14).
In 2007, a surveillance system for influenza-like ill-
ness (ILI) and virologic data was established in Beijing. 
This system tracks ILI and laboratory-confirmed influenza 
in 153 general hospitals throughout Beijing. We describe 
the surveillance system, the surveillance data accumulated 
during the 2007–08 influenza season, and the performance 
of the early warning system.
Methods
Beijing is located in the temperate zone of the North-
ern Hemisphere, where influenza typically peaks seasonally 
once each year (15). Hospitals in Beijing are classified into 
3 levels, depending on their size and the techniques, equip-
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ment, and staff available (Table 1) (16). In Beijing, patients 
with ILI traditionally seek medical attention at their local 
hospitals rather than at private clinics.
Surveillance for ILI and Virologic Data
Influenza surveillance was performed from September 
1, 2007, through April 30, 2008. In this system, ILI surveil-
lance was conducted in the outpatient and emergency clin-
ics of internal medicine and pediatric wards of 153 hospi-
tals: 29 were level 1, 71 were level 2, and 53 were level 3.
Under the system, participating referral doctors were 
required to diagnose ILI by using a strict ILI definition (fe-
ver >38°C, either cough or sore throat, and no other labo-
ratory-confirmed evidence) (7) and to record the number of 
ILI consultations by age group (i.e., 0–4 years, 5–14 years, 
15–24 years, 25–59 years, and >60 years) on a fixed form 
daily. These data were entered daily into the Beijing Moni-
toring and Early Warning System for Infectious Diseases in 
Hospitals by designated hospital staff.
Fourteen hospitals from 6 districts were selected as 
sites  for  collecting  specimens.  Pharyngeal  swab  speci-
mens from the ILI case-patients (within 3 days of symp-
tom onset from patients who had not received antiviral 
drugs) were collected from the hospitals by district CDC 
staff. The specimens were transported to the correspon-
dent  laboratories  in  viral  transport  medium  at  4°C  for 
subsequent isolation and identification. Six independent 
laboratories in different districts participated in the col-
laborative laboratory network.
Weekly laboratory surveillance data were used as the 
approved standard estimate to measure the onset of an in-
fluenza epidemic. By monitoring the rate of positive isola-
tions, changes in the activity of influenza virus were tracked. 
The positive isolation rate and the maximum weekly posi-
tive isolation rate were compared to determine the week 
the epidemic began. Because these rates change yearly, a 
fixed rate could not be regarded as the threshold. We used 
the following standard to ascertain the onset week: if the 
positive isolation rate in any given week exceeded 40% of 
the maximum weekly positive isolation rate in the overall 
influenza season, this week was then considered the onset 
week of the influenza epidemic (17).
EARS and Early Aberration Detection of ILI Surveil-
lance Data in Beijing
We used EARS-X v2.8 (18) to analyze the ILI surveil-
lance data. The methods used in EARS are described else-
where (13,14,18). Both the weekly ILI rates and ILI counts 
were analyzed by EARS-X. The nonhistorical method used 
in EARS consists of 3 algorithms, called C1-mild (C1), C2-
medium (C2), and C3-ultra (C3). The terms mild, medium, 
and ultra refer to the level of sensitivity of the 3 alterna-
tive statistical methods, with C1 being the least sensitive 
and C3 the most sensitive. The thresholds for C1, C2, and 
C3 are based on a 1-sided positive CUSUM calculation 
(13,14,18). For C1 and C2, a warning is generated when 
the current count is greater than the baseline mean plus 3 
SD. C1 uses data from 1 to 7 days before the current day 
for calculating the mean and SD, whereas C2 and C3 use 
data from 3 to 9 days in the past for calculating the mean 
and SD. For C3, the algorithm is based on a CUSUM cal-
culation with an average run length time of 3 days. If the 
calculated value is >2, a C3 warning is produced. C1, C2, 
and C3 methods were simultaneously adopted for compre-
hensive analysis.
To determine the onset of the influenza epidemic, we 
established a standard based on warings in EARS (C1, C2, 
and C3). According to the difference of the sensitivities of 
C1, C2, and C3, the standard incorporated the following 
situations: 1) when a C1 warning was produced in a given 
week and the value of the following week was greater than 
that of the selected week, the selected week was the week 
of onset; or 2) when a C2 warning was produced in a given 
week and a C1 or C2 warning was generated in the follow-
ing week, the following week was the week of onset; or 3) 
when a C3 warning was produced in a given week, and the 
following consecutive 2 warnings of C1, C2, or C3 were 
generated in the following 2 weeks, and the above 2 situa-
tions did not occur, the third week of the warning occurring 
was the week of onset.
Results
ILI Surveillance
During the 2007–08 influenza season, the peak in ILI 
was identified on the basis of the weekly ILI surveillance 
data. For the 153 hospitals in the surveillance system, the 
highest weekly ILI rate during this season was 40.1 cases 
per 1,000 consultations in the week 53 of 2007 (Figure 1), 1 
week earlier than when the ILI count peaked (18,203 cases 
in the first week of 2008, Figure 2). The highest weekly 
ILI rate and count are 1.7× and 2.0× as high as the average 
ILI rate (23.8/1,000) and count (9,154 cases), respectively. 
After stratification by hospital levels, the trends for level 1, 
2, and 3 hospitals were similar. The highest ILI count for 
all age groups except the >60 years group occurred in the 
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Table 1. Three levels of hospitals in Beijing, People’s Republic of 
China
Level Description
1 Services include medical treatment, prevention, 
healthcare, and rehabilitation for a community with a 
population <100,000 persons 
2 Services include medical treatment, prevention, 
healthcare, and rehabilitation for multiple communities 
(population >100,000 persons 
3 Regional healthcare facility with specialized high-level 
healthcare services for several districts Influenza Surveillance System, Beijing, China
first week of 2008. For the >60 years group the ILI count 
peaked in the third week of 2008 (Figure 3).
Virologic Surveillance
Pharyngeal swab samples were collected from 2,057 
ILI case-patients during the influenza surveillance period. 
Thirty percent (n = 611) of these patients tested positive for 
influenza (type A, 151; type B, 450; untyped, 10). Overall, 
influenza B (Yamataga-lineage) was the dominant strain 
detected; however, late in the season, influenza A was iso-
lated more frequently (Figure 4). On the basis of the 40% 
maximum weekly isolation rate (the gold standard indicat-
ing the onset of the influenza epidemic), week 49 of 2007 
was considered the onset week (Figure 4).
Early Warning by EARS of the Onset  
of an Influenza Epidemic
According to the ILI rate data (Figure 5), a warning 
was first produced in week 51 of 2007, with C1, C2, and C3 
warnings generated simultaneously. During week 52, the 
rate of ILI was greater than in the previous week; therefore, 
week 51 was set as the onset of the influenza epidemic, 
according to the standard described in the methods. From 
the ILI count data (Figure 6), 3 consecutive C3 warnings 
were produced between week 46 and week 48. According 
to these data, the influenza epidemic could have begun dur-
ing week 48.
After  stratifying  the  data  by  hospital  level  and  age 
group, we determined the onset week from the ILI rate 
data for levels 1, 2, and 3 hospitals was week 51 of 2007   
(Table 2). On the basis of the ILI count data, the onset week 
for level 1 hospitals was week 51, whereas for the level 2 
and 3 hospitals, it was week 49. According to the ILI count 
data, onset weeks varied for different age groups.
Discussion
The 2007–08 influenza season in Beijing was mild, 
without a large documented epidemic or an outbreak. Influ-
enza B predominated during the season in Beijing, which 
differed from the situations recorded in other countries and 
regions, including Europe and North America, where in-
fluenza A predominated (19). Influenza activity in Beijing 
may have been mild because of the epidemic characteris-
tics of influenza B (20). From the data, we found that the 
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                    Figure 1. Weekly influenza-like illness (ILI) rates during the 2007–
08 influenza season, Beijing, People’s Republic of China.
Figure 2. Weekly influenza-like illness (ILI) counts during the 2007–
08 influenza season, Beijing, People’s Republic of China.
Figure 3. Weekly influenza-like illness (ILI) counts by age group 
during the 2007–08 influenza season, Beijing, People’s Republic 
of China.RESEARCH
highest rate of influenza isolation occurred in the first week 
of 2008, and the highest ILI rate (except the false high ILI 
rate in the fifth week of 2008, the Chinese Spring Festival 
week) occurred 1 week earlier (week 53 of 2007). How-
ever, on closer examination, we found that the week of the 
peak influenza isolation rate was actually almost identical 
to that of the highest ILI rate. Occurrence of the highest ILI 
rate in week 53 of 2007 resulted from the New Year’s holi-
days, which could have caused a decline in consultations 
during this period.
To understand the differences between the efficien-
cies of ILI rates and ILI counts in detecting the onset of 
an influenza epidemic, we analyzed both by using EARS. 
The onset week determined by the ILI rate (week 51) was 
2 weeks later than the onset week (week 49) determined 
by a standard. However, in comparison, the onset week 
as determined by the ILI count was week 48, which still 
was close to the onset week determined by the reference 
standard but 3 weeks earlier than that determined by the 
ILI rate. When the data were stratified by hospital level 
and by age group, the onset weeks (week 46–week 49) 
as determined by the ILI count data were earlier than the 
week determined by the ILI rates (week 51), except for 
level 1 hospitals and the age group >60 years of age. One 
possible reason for the earlier onset detected by the ILI 
counts than by the ILI rates was the dependence of ILI 
rates on ILI counts and total consultations to the hospi-
tals. Because humans are at high risk for many diseases 
during winter, consultations about other diseases also will 
increase. In this situation, it is optimal to consider the re-
sults for both the ILI rates and ILI counts simultaneously 
before any public health decisions are made.
Assessment of the timeliness and accuracy of deter-
mining the onset by hospital level showed that ILI count 
data from level 2 and 3 hospitals were more timely and ac-
curate than were data from level 1 hospitals (week 49 rather 
than week 51). This result may be due to the tendency for 
level 2 and 3 hospitals to be larger and able to afford more 
comprehensive  and  reliable  data  than  level  1  hospitals. 
Fluctuations in consultations could affect the accuracy of 
determining the onset of the influenza epidemic.
The inclusion of level 1 hospitals in the surveillance 
system may play a substantial role in the surveillance for 
human avian influenza and future pandemic activity. These 
hospitals were selected from smaller towns that have more 
poultry workers. These hospitals are likely to be the first 
destination for poultry workers who have ILI symptoms. If 
an atypical increase in the number of ILI consultations in 
these hospitals occurs in a short period, this increase could 
signal a need for further investigations and the institution of 
possible control measures. Poultry workers are a high-risk 
population for avian influenza (21,22), and ILI symptoms 
are the precursory symptoms of avian influenza (23). Ear-
lier detection of ILI cluster cases in poultry workers may 
be helpful for finding clustered cases of avian influenza, 
human-to-human transmission cases, and the early stages 
of a pandemic. Therefore, ILI surveillance in these level 1 
hospitals still should be continuously conducted.
When we stratified ILI count data by age group, we 
found the accuracy and timeliness of determining the on-
set of the influenza epidemic by the ILI count data were 
most efficient when using data in the age groups 15–24 
years and 25–59 years. Although the onset weeks deter-
mined by the ILI data were earlier than week 49 for those 
0–4-years and 5–14 years, this finding may be more likely 
to have resulted from respiratory syncytial virus circula-
tion and infection. This virus can increase the number of 
emergency department visits and hospitalization in young 
children, and its season usually occurs before the annual 
influenza season (24,25). Another reason might be that 
the infection or reinfection rate in children by predomi-
nating influenza B virus was higher than that in adults 
(26), and thus more children were brought to doctors for 
treatment than adults. ILI data from the those >60 years 
of age were the last to give a warning for the epidemic 
onset (week 51) from the 5 age groups, perhaps because 
1606  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 15, No. 10, October 2009
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
363738394041424344454647484950515253 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516
2007 2008
Week
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
r
a
t
e
,
 
%
Untyped
Influenza B (Yamagata)
Influenza B (Victoria)
Influenza A (H3N2)
Influenza A (H1N1)
Positive %
           
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Weekly distribution of influenza isolates during the 2007–
08 influenza season, Beijing, People’s Republic of China.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
2007 2008
Week
R
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
I
L
I
/
1
,
0
0
0
 
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
Actual rate of ILI
Average of previous 7 days
Figure 5. Weekly influenza-like illness (ILI) rates by Early Aberration 
Reporting System to detect the onset of the influenza epidemic 
during the 2007–08 season, Beijing, People’s Republic of China. 
Squares and triangles represent different alert situations—C1-mild 
(C1), C2-medium (C2), and C3-ultra (C3)—automatically generated 
by the reporting system: diamond, C1C3; triangle, C2C3.Influenza Surveillance System, Beijing, China
the ILI definition used may have been too strict to screen 
the influenza cases in the elderly. In elderly persons, fe-
ver and cough are relatively less common than they are in 
younger persons (27). In this system, monitoring ILI data 
in the young age groups is more efficient than monitoring 
influenza activity in the older age groups.
The ILI data obtained were the only means used to 
evaluate the efficacy of the surveillance system in detecting 
the onset of the influenza epidemic. We did not use the site-
specific or age group–specific virologic data to ascertain 
whether true differences existed in the timing of influenza 
virus circulation between these specific groups. This omis-
sion is a limitation of this study.
In many developing countries, such as the People’s 
Republic of China, surveillance systems have only recently 
been  implemented;  therefore,  classic  statistical  methods 
that require detailed historical data are not suitable (28–31). 
In these countries, programs such as EARS provide a suit-
able tool for detecting the aberration of data in surveillance 
systems without the need for historical data. It provides the 
most optimal and accessible tool, not only for seasonal sur-
veillance but also for outbreak surveillance in developing 
countries. Furthermore, EARS is simple to grasp and prac-
tice and is freely downloadable from the US CDC website 
(http://emergency.cdc.gov/surveillance/ears)
The influenza surveillance system introduced in Bei-
jing provided timely and accurate surveillance informa-
tion that was consistent with data obtained from virologic 
surveillance for influenza. The system enabled us to detect 
the onset and peak of the epidemic. The ILI data from the 
larger hospitals may have afforded more valuable infor-
mation for monitoring the onset of the epidemic than the 
data from smaller hospitals. However, given the current 
climate with avian influenza, it is crucial that the small 
provincial hospitals remain. In this situation, EARS was 
useful in the analysis of disease surveillance data, giving 
us the opportunity to undertake the surveillance without 
any historical data.
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Table 2. Onset of influenza epidemic as determined by the various ILI data during the 2007–08 influenza season, Beijing, People’s
Republic of China* 
ILI rate  ILI count 
Data Warnings meeting the standard  Onset week  Warnings meeting the standard  Onset week 
Hospital level 
  1  C1 in a given week and the greater 
following value 
51 C1 in a given week and the greater 
following value 
51
  2  Consecutive 2 C2  51 Consecutive 2 C2  49†
  3  C1 in a given week and the greater 
following value 
51 Consecutive 3 C3  49†
Age group, y 
  0–4  NA NA Consecutive 3 C3  48
  5–14  NA NA Consecutive 2 C2  46
  15–24  NA NA C1 in a given week and the greater 
following value 
49†
  25–59  NA NA C1 in a given week and the greater 
following value 
49†
t 60 NA NA C1 in a given week and the greater 
following value 
51
*ILI, influenza-like illness; C1, C1-mild algorithm; C2, C2-medium algorithm; C3, C3-ultra algorithm; NA, not available. 
†Onset week, determined by the accepted standard based on 40% of the maximum weekly isolation rate, is the threshold 
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Figure 6. Weekly illness-like illness (ILI) counts by Early Aberration 
Response System to detect the onset of the influenza epidemic 
during the 2007–08 season, Beijing, People’s Republic of China. 
Triangles and diamonds represent different alert situations—C1-
mild  (C1),  C2-medium  (C2),  and  C3-ultra  (C3)—automatically 
generated by the reporting system: triangle, C2C3; open diamond, 
C3; and solid diamond, C1C2C3.RESEARCH
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